Phishing Campaign Uses Calendar Invites and Live Proxies to Hijack Google Sessions
According to reporting from The Hacker News, a phishing campaign that began in mid-August 2026 has been targeting corporate users by stealing active Google session credentials rather than simply harvesting passwords. The report notes that the links and infrastructure used in the attack pass the checks defenders typically rely on to flag malicious URLs, and that this evasion was a deliberate design choice by the operator, built around calendar invites and what appears to be a live proxy mechanism sitting between the victim and the real Google login flow.
This style of attack falls into the broader category of session hijacking, sometimes called adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) phishing. Rather than stealing a static password, the attacker relays the victim's live authentication traffic through a proxy server, capturing the resulting session cookie or token once the user successfully logs in and completes any multi-factor authentication step. Because the token represents an already-authenticated session, it lets the attacker bypass MFA entirely and access the victim's mailbox, files, or connected SaaS applications without needing the original credentials again. Calendar invites are an effective lure in this context because they often appear in a trusted, low-friction workflow, arrive from seemingly known contacts or scheduling tools, and are frequently clicked without the scrutiny applied to typical email attachments or links.
The significance of this type of campaign lies in its ability to defeat controls organizations lean on most heavily: URL reputation filters, sandboxing, and MFA itself. When session tokens are stolen in real time through a proxy, traditional indicators of compromise such as malicious domains or known-bad file hashes may be absent or short-lived, making detection reliant on behavioral and session-level signals rather than static blocklists.
Defenders should treat live session theft as a standing risk for any organization heavily reliant on Google Workspace or similar cloud identity providers. Practical steps include deploying phishing-resistant authentication methods such as FIDO2/WebAuthn hardware keys, which are not susceptible to token relay in the same way as OTP-based MFA; monitoring for anomalous session activity such as logins from unexpected IP ranges or impossible travel patterns; shortening session token lifetimes and enforcing re-authentication for sensitive actions; and training users to scrutinize unexpected calendar invites and meeting links with the same caution applied to email attachments.
Source: The Hacker News
Read the original report ↗This is an original summary written by CyberSkii for reference. All rights to the underlying reporting remain with the publisher linked above.