Telecom-Level Espionage: SilentAir Group Intercepts SMS 2FA and Calls in Taiwan
Telecom security firm Enea has disclosed findings on a new espionage group it calls SilentAir, which it says gained access to compromised equipment inside mobile network operators in Asia. Using this foothold, the group was able to intercept calls and SMS messages belonging to selected targets, with the majority of victims located in Taiwan. The reported capability included interception of one-time SMS codes used for two-factor authentication, giving the actor a potential path to bypass account protections for targeted individuals.
Attacks against telecom core infrastructure represent one of the most severe categories of surveillance threat because they operate below the level most users or even enterprise security teams can monitor. By compromising signaling systems, network elements, or operator equipment directly, an attacker can intercept communications transparently, without needing to touch the victim's device or deploy conventional malware. This class of activity is typically associated with state-aligned espionage operations, given the resources, access, and persistence required to breach carrier-grade infrastructure, and it has historically been used to target journalists, dissidents, government officials, and other high-value individuals.
The targeting of SMS-based 2FA codes specifically underscores a long-known weakness in that authentication method: SMS delivery relies on telecom network trust, and any actor with access to that layer can intercept codes regardless of how strong the underlying account password is. This has pushed security guidance for years toward app-based authenticators, hardware security keys, or other out-of-band methods that do not depend on the telecom carrier.
For organizations and individuals who may be considered high-value targets—executives, government-adjacent personnel, journalists, or activists—this incident reinforces the importance of moving away from SMS as a sole second factor. Security teams should prioritize phishing-resistant authentication such as FIDO2/WebAuthn hardware keys or authenticator apps, monitor for anomalous account recovery or login patterns that might indicate intercepted codes, and treat telecom-based signals (calls, SMS) as an insecure channel for anything sensitive. Telecom operators themselves should continue hardening signaling protocols and auditing equipment access to reduce the risk of this kind of infrastructure-level compromise.
Source: The Hacker News
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